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Abstract
The withdrawal of United States military forces from Iraq and the resulting
conclusion of the Iraq War have left an indelible impression on Americans concerning
the cost of the third-longest war in United States history.

Opinions and arguments

regarding foreign policy, national expenditures and human rights violations typically
dominate conversation, but there is a less mentioned topic regarding damage to Iraqi
cultural heritage. In April 2003 Iraqi civilians looted the National Museum of Iraq during
the push of Coalition forces through Baghdad. The museum collection suffered from a
lack of cultural protection preparedness in military planning. The incident at the museum
is a recent reminder that war threatens archaeological, historic and artistic treasures
through direct damage and increased exposure to opportunistic looting.
News reports about the ongoing unrest and civil war in Syria reVIve the
importance of establishing cultural heritage protection policies.

Lessons in cultural

protection exist from previous World War II and Iraq War experiences, but these are not
"catchall solutions" that can be applied to any combat situation. Chaos and uncertainty
amid the horrors of war make the planning of an all-purpose policy difficult if not
impossible.

An effective response needs to be fluid to accommodate the changing

demands of armed conflict based on the unique conditions of that particular war.
This thesis intends to synthesize a suggested strategy for preserving cultural
heritage during a time of war by comparing organized efforts of the Kunstschutz and
Monuments Men art protection agencies of World War II and antiquities repatriation
performed by the Joint Interagency Coordination Group during the Iraq War.
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The

similarities and differences between these organizations help understand why a single
plan may not succeed in every wartime environment.
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I. "Museum Treasures Now War Booty"
No plan of action can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major
forces of the enemy ... The commander is compelled during the whole campaign to reach
decisions on the basis of situations that cannot be predicted. All consecutive acts of war
are, therefore, not executions of a premeditated plan, but spontaneous action, directed by
military tact.
General Helmut von Moltke the Elderl
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On 12 April 2003 staff members of the National Museum of Iraq experienced a
dismal sight.

The staff had not returned to the museum since soldiers of the Iraqi

Republican Guard took up fighting positions in the museum compound four days earlier.
The museum is located on the west bank of the Tigris River in Baghdad. Its proximity to
the Ministry of Defense, National Bank of Iraq and government buildings of the Oil

1
i

Ministry caused the museum to be surrounded by heavy fighting during the push of
Coalition forces through Baghdad. Once the fighting waned, museum staff returned to

i

~

find smashed glass gallery displays, ransacked storage rooms and thousands of missing
antiquities.

\I

The National Museum of Iraq, also known as the Iraq Museum, experienced a

j

wave of looting by Iraqi civilians between 10 April and 12 April 2003. The thefts

I

!,
occurred during the struggle for Baghdad in the early months of the Iraq War. American
forces secured the Iraq Museum compound on 16 April and an anti-terrorist activity
group called the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) began an investigation
and repatriation program on 23 April. By that time numerous media outlets described the
story as the greatest loss of cultural heritage in human history, using headlines such as

1 Lynn,

John A. Battle: A History a/Combat and Culture. Boulder: Westview Press, 2003, 212.
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"Pillagers Strip Iraq Museum of Its Treasure," "U.S. Blamed For Failure to Stop Sacking
of Museum" and "Museum Treasures Now War Booty.,,2
Exaggerated claims stated that up to 170,000 artifacts had been looted from the
Iraq Museum and that its galleries were empty. The investigation of the JIACG team
revealed that significant portions of the valuable collection had remained untouched by
vandals and the number of missing artifacts was approximately 15,000.

The Iraq

Museum reports that roughly half that number has been recovered as of September 201O?
Yet the successful return of many objects to the Iraq Museum does not mask deficiencies
in United States military planning regarding the protection of Iraqi cultural treasures.
Precedents exist in which the protection of cultural heritage and repatriation of stolen
treasures had been incorporated into army strategies of invasion and occupation. During
World War II, German and American armies developed responses to similar issues of
cultural heritage protection experienced recently in Iraq. Two separate art protection
organizations, the Kunstschutz and the Monuments Men, worked to preserve cultural
treasures in time of war during the 1940s. If the experiences of these two agencies are
documented, why did the Coalition invasion forces of the Iraq War not incorporate the
policies and procedures employed by these groups during World War II into their battle
plans?

Lessons provided by World War II examples were not entirely compatible with
the situation in Iraq.

Coalition war planners failed to adequately incorporate the

Bogdanos, Matthew and William Patrick. Thieves ofBaghdad: One Marine's Passion for Ancient
Civilizations and the Journey to Recover the World's Greatest Stolen Treasures. New York: Bloomsbury
Publishing, 2005, llO. The article headlines are from The New York Times, 13 April 2003, Independent, 14
Apri12003 and Associated Press, 12 April 2003, respectively.
3 Myers, Steven Lee. "Iraqi Treasures Return, but Questions Remain". The New York Times. 7 September
2010. Web. http://www.nytimes.coml20 10/09/08/worldimiddleeastl08iraq.html ?ref=nationalmuseumofiraq.
Accessed 26 April 2013.
2
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teachings of World War II art protection groups into their invasion strategy, but the
lessons learned during the 1940s were not necessarily lost during the Iraq War. The
JIACG proceeded to blaze their own trail in post-invasion Baghdad that had parallel
similarities to their World War II counterparts. The unpredictability of warfare renders
past experiences as indefinite solutions for present problems and prevents the careful
planning of an effective response prior to a cultural heritage disaster. As a result, the
future of protection plans must be fluid in nature and not bound to absolute properties.
That does not mean guidelines cannot exist within the perceived chaos of war. Similar
elements present in all three protection agency examples - the Kunstschutz in France, the
Monuments Men in Italy and France and the JIACG in Iraq - can be used to advise future
planning.
Comparing the historical practices of German and Allied forces during World
War II with their American counterparts in the Iraq War can isolate the essential needs of
an effective protection plan during wartime. Viewing the results side-by-side reveals
which practices were successfully replicated and what practices were not applicable in
each cultural protection organization. This paper will begin with (1) a look at how the
practice of cultural heritage protection evolved in historical perspective, followed by (2)
an exploration of recent developments in Iraq. The next section (3) considers these
practices vis-a-vis the chaotic nature of war and assesses the problems it causes in the
context of protection planning. The last section (4) compiles suggested best practices
based on lessons that transcended the wars of the twentieth and twenty-fIrst-century. The
incident at the Iraq Museum is a haunting reminder of the direct and indirect threats faced
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by museum collections in the vicinity of anned combatants. It simultaneously stresses
the need for preventive measures to be reestablished in future theatres of war.
The Iraq Museum's message of vulnerability is currently being revisited by news
reports covering the unrest and civil war in Syria. Those of us who are fortunate to not
have a conflict brewing in our backyards watch our television screens depict Syrian
civilians who are embroiled in the horrors of war. A sense of global community draws
our attention to the plight of those caught in the turmoil and to the destruction wrought on
the world's cultural treasures.

Collectively Syria and Iraq form the Levant and

Mesopotamia regions of the Fertile Crescent that fostered the emergence of civilization.
They are historically significant sources of archaeological knowledge and contain
numerous cultural heritage sites.
Archaeologist Cheikhmous Ali describes damage to Syria's heritage sites as
"vandalism," adding, "a whole civilization belonging to all humanity is being
destroyed.,,4 Dr. McGuire Gibson of the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago
placed a similar emphasis on Iraq in 2003 - calling it the most important center of ancient
culture in the world - when he met with representatives of the Pentagon and U.S. State
Department prior to the Iraq War. s Ten years separate the looting of the Iraq Museum
and the ongoing civil war in Syria, but the threat to cultural heritage - and the resulting
need for adequate protection practices - is still a very real and present danger.

4- Chivers,

C. J. "Grave Robbers and War Steal Syria's History". The New York Times. 6 April 2013. Web.
http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/04/07/worldlmiddleeastlsyrian-war-devastates-ancient
sites.html?hp&J=I&. Accessed 12 April 2013.
5 Stone, Peter G. and Joanne Farchakh Bajjaly. The Destruction ofCultural Heritage in Iraq. Woodbridge:
The Boydell Press, 2008, 38.
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II. Lessons Learned
The specialized knowledge needed for delicate military operations concerning
cultural heritage objects is most readily available from academic institutions. Scholars,
professors and museum specialists are the front-line experts to consult when protecting
objects of cultural heritage. These individuals can identify threatened works and know
the appropriate responses for their care and preservation.

Many have honed their

specialized skills during long careers with their associated institutions and are valuable
contacts for military planners to keep on hand. Academic institutions for this paper
include colleges or universities, museums, art galleries and non-profit learned societies.

1
I
i

I
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During World War II the militaries of Germany and the United States selected
individuals from this community of higher learning to staff their art protection agencies.
German and American army commanders sought professionals with extensive knowledge
on cultural property, how to identify it and how to handle it.

Individuals with

qualifications that met the demands of cultural protection were selected for service under

I
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parent army organizations.

Some were assigned officer ranks in their respective

militaries to further their leadership capabilities and strengthen the influence of cultural
heritage protection policies in military procedure.

The Kunstschutz
The first of these organizations to be established was the German Kunstschutz.
The Kunstschutz, meaning "art protection," was a German administrative organization
born out of the needs of World War I and revived in World War II. It was composed of

9

art historians, scholars and museum professionals who were determined to preserve the
art treasures of Europe. Kunstschutz officers worked alongside German Army units to
prevent art damage, either through keeping soldiers away from artworks or moving them
to safer locations away from combat areas. During World War II the Kunstschutz made a
notable effort to keep cultural property within the country of origin even as other
organizations, such as the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR) - a subgroup of the
Nazi Party Office of Foreign Affairs dedicated to appropriating cultural property 
removed artworks to Germany for personal or state collections. Officers such as Count
Franz Wolff-Mettemich and Bernhard von Tieschowitz made it their personal duty to
prevent art looting and deportation to Germany and reverted to toe-to-toe confrontation
with high-ranking Nazi officials when necessary to protect the cultural heritage of
occupied nations.
An early version of the Kunstschutz originated during the adverse conditions of

World War I. Following the initial German advances made in 1914, the German military
found itself in possession of large areas of France and Belgium until the end of the war in
1918. The Kunstschutz were an extension of German policies in action and were created
out of a military need for discipline and order in an occupied territory. A concerted effort
was made by German forces led by architectural historian Paul Clemen to protect the
artworks and architecture of these territories and prevent damage to them whenever
possible, thus preserving them for their return to the French and Belgians during
peacetime. This included documenting culturally significant structures and publicizing
the threats posed to them by being caught in the conflict.

10

The Kunstschutz did not receive the recognition it deserved from the victorious
Entente Powers following World War I, but their efforts did not go completely unnoticed
by the international academic community. The American College Art Journal remarked
that the Kunstschutz did admirable work for the cultural property of the occupied
countries. 6 British archaeologist Leonard Woolley noted that prior to World War I, "no
army had thought of protecting the monuments of the country in which and with which it
was at war, and there were no precedents to follow."7 The actions of the Kunstschutz
were the first of their kind for treating cultural property and were imitated and expanded
by German forces during the next European war.
The invasion of Poland in September 1939 marked the beginning of World War II
in Europe and with it a need for academic professionalism. Art scholars and museum
specialists were needed in force to reduce the potential damage caused by millions of
soldiers marching to war. The policy of Lebensraum, or "living space," promoted by
Adolf Hitler's Nazi ideology encouraged the destruction of Polish culture and led to
widespread looting, vandalism and destruction of cultural property in the defeated
country. Many German officers of the Armed Forces High Command did not share the
same views as Hitler and re-established the Kunstschutz to prevent such a disgraceful
episode from reoccurring during the next German military campaign in Western Europe. s
A directive from the Armed Forces High Command re-created the Kunstschutz
organization on 11 May 1940, the day after the invasion of the Low Countries and France

Nathan, Walter L. "Paul Clemen (1866-1947)". College ArtJourna/ 7, No.3 (Spring 1948),217.
Lambourne, Nicola. War damage in Western Europe: the destruction ofhistoric monuments during the
Second World War. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001,124.
8 Harclerode, Peter and Brendan Pittaway. The Lost Masters: The Looting ofEurope's Treasurehouses.
London: Victor Gollancz, 1999, 11.
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began. 9 Kunstschutz units worked in tandem with German Anny units and followed them
into battle. They were responsible for compiling lists of artworks located within a battle
zone so that armies of occupation could protect them from damage. The High Command
selected scholars and museum professionals to fill the ranks of the Kunstschutz because
of their backgrounds in art recognition, handling and preservation. Mettemich, the first
leader of the Kunstschutz, was a distinguished art historian and held the position of
Provincial Curator of the Rhineland-Westphalia region of Germany before the war broke
out in Europe. lo His successor, von Tieschowitz, was also an art historian.
The Kunstschutz performed a multitude of duties to preserve the cultural treasures
of the occupied territories.

These included rebuilding damaged property, limiting

German Army access to cultural objects, conducting art research and fostering fruitful
relations with French museum and art professionals. The actions and accomplishments
of the Kunstschutz during World War II can be used as a rubric for comparing the
similarities and differences of subsequent cultural heritage organizations.

Each

organization developed their policies and procedures according to the resources they had
at their disposal and the wartime environment around them. The Kunstschutz policies can
be summarized in four main elements: (1) increased awareness, (2) cooperation with the
native population, (3) repair and restoration of artifacts, monuments and historic
buildings and (4) isolation of protected sites from military and public use.
Increasing awareness draws public attention to objects of cultural heritage that are
threatened by war. An informed public that understands how to appropriately react to
9 Feliciano, Hector. The Lost Museum: The Nazi Conspiracy to Steal the World's Greatest Works ofArt.
New York: Perseus Books Group, 1997, 34.
]0 Nicholas, Lynn H. The Rape ofEuropa: The Fate ofEurope's Treasures in the Third Reich and the
Second World War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995, 119.
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encounters with cultural property increases the chance that these objects will escape
damage or be returned to their original owners in the event of theft. Implementation of
such a policy may include publications, meetings, lectures and outreach programs in both
civilian and military communities.
The Kunstschutz was the first of the art protection organizations to disseminate
information regarding cultural heritage and circulate their ideals among soldiers.
Kunstschutz officers took full advantage of the popularity of propaganda posters to

inform German soldiers about the importance of art protection. Posters sanctioned by the
officers included messages such as "Vorsicht beim Heizenl Du zerstorst sonst historische
Werter' (Caution with heating! It may destroy historic works!) and "Zeigt Euch als
Deutsche und beweist den Franzosen, dass wir als Trager einer eigenen hohen Kultur
auch Achtung vor den Giltern fremder Kulturen besitzenr' (Show yourselves as Germans

and prove to the French that we, as carriers of our own high culture, also respect the
assets of other cultures!). II

Posters like these were posted in conspicuous areas

throughout the occupied nations of Europe, particularly in places where soldiers were
billeted.
Achieving a level of mutual respect between the German occupation force and
French civilians was a lofty goal for the second poster example, but fostering relations
with the native population was an imperative task for the success of the Kunstschutz .
. Mettemich and his officers realized that proactive and positive reinforcement of the local
community builds a layer of trust, maintains a higher level of morale among the local

Karlsgodt, Elizabeth Campbell. Defending national treasures: French art and heritage under Vichy.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 20ll, 40.

II
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population and reduces their VIew of the Kunstschutz as an outside, InVaSiVe or
unwelcome entity.
Somewhat surprisingly, in the light of the infamous art theft and persecution of
occupied peoples at the hands of Nazi Germany, the German officers of the Kunstschutz
were remarkably successful at maintaining fruitful relations with the citizens of occupied
nations, especially the French. Mettemich disdained the extremism of Nazi ideology and,
like other members of the Kunstschutz, believed it was their duty to protect French
heritage. 12 The men chosen for the Kunstschutz were well-known art historians and
usually not members of the Nazi Party.13 This was a direct consideration of the German
Anned Forces High Command to reduce political tensions between Kunstschutz officers
and the local art officials they would be required to work with in occupied countries.
The Kunstschutz helped French professionals evacuate artworks from threatened
public museums and protect them from damage during the German occupation of
France. 14 Many of Mettemich's actions directly assisted French art officials in several
important ways. He guaranteed the Direction des musees, or "Directorate of Museums,"
in France that German soldiers would not requisition chateaux housing precious art
collections. He provided fuel-rationing coupons to enable French authorities to transfer
works of art to safer locations. He located more suitable art storage locations when
humidity levels endangered their original depots.

Lastly, under Mettemich the

Kunstschutz struck and agreement with the Direction des musees that cases of artwork

could only be opened by French museum personnel in the presence of the art storage or
12 Ibid,

39.
13 Ross, Marvin C. "The Kunstschutz in Occupied France". College Art JournalS, No.4 (May 1946),337.
14 Karlsgodt, 41.

14

holding facility director and a representative of the Kunstschutz. All of these actions
gave French museum officials greater control over their art collections during the German
occupation period. Mettemich's legacy of cooperation with French locals was continued
by his replacement von Tieschowitz. Later in the war, when Germany was desperate for
workers from the occupied territories, von Tieschowitz exempted French museum
personnel from the labor draft until replacements could be found. l5
The Kunstschutz provided some assistance to French civilians that went directly
against orders from the Nazi government or directly sabotaged the actions of other Nazi
organizations. For example, Mettemich countered German orders and allowed French
guards at museum art storage depots to bear arms. Additionally, Mettemich frequently
notified his French contacts in the Direction des musees of upcoming ERR raids so that
artworks could be removed from their storage facilities and hidden to escape deportation
to Germany. 16
The Kunstschutz "on the whole acted well in protecting monuments and acquired
goodwill" in such occupied countries as France, Greece and others. I7 The attitudes and
agendas of their officers fostered positive relations with local museum officials and the
native population. Indeed, one of the reasons Mettemich was transferred in June 1942
from Paris back to the German Rhineland was because Nazi party members were
discomforted by how much the French favored him.ls Following the war, the French

Ibid, 78.
Nicholas, 132.
11 Hammond, Mason. "The War and Art Treasures in Gennany". College Art JournalS, No.3 (March
1946),215.
18 Hammond, Mason. "Remembrance of Things Past": The Protection and Preservation of Monwnents,
Works of Art, Libraries, and Archives during and after World War II". Proceedings ofthe Massachusetts
Historical Society. Third Series 92 (1980), 89.
IS
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government awarded Metternich and von Tieschowitz the Legion of Honor, their highest
decoration for individuals who serve France or the ideals it upholds.

19

The positive

feedback extended beyond France to other Allied powers. The U.S. Office of Strategic
Services (aSS, and predecessor to the CIA) filed a report stating that Mettemich was
"universally regarded as having acted at all times with complete integrity and having
shown the greatest sense of responsibility for the preservation ofworks.,,20
Yet it was impossible for the Kunstschutz to protect every building or monument
in France from the destructive nature of war. The importance of human life will always
surpass that of cultural objects and military commanders will not alter their conduct if
doing so threatens the lives of soldiers or civilians. This must be universally accepted
and cultural protection organizations must be able to respond accordingly.

For the

Kunstschutz, safeguarding cultural objects included repairing or restoring damaged

structures as a preservation measure. It also reduced the risk of increased damage if the
structures were left unattended.
Five months after the fall of France the Kunstschutz received an order from the
German occupation commander to investigate important chateaux and assess which had
sustained damage. The Kunstschutz were allowed to order any German soldiers found in
these buildings to vacate if repair work was required. 21 This order demonstrates the
willingness of German Army commanders to cooperate with the Kunstschutz to protect
the cultural treasures of occupied peoples. Additionally, the Kunstschutz successfully
acquired cement, lumber and other building materials through friendly connections in the
19

Karlsgodt, 41.

Freeman, Kirrily. '''The bells, too, are fighting': The Fate of European Church Bells in the Second World
War". Canadian Journal ofHistory 43, No.3 (Winter 2008),436.
21 Ross, 346.
20

16

Gennan military logistics system before they became scarce after the Allied invasion of
Nonnandy.
The amount of repairs needed for cultural objects or property can be reduced or
eliminated if military forces can arrive in time to secure threatened sites.

Isolating

protected sites from military and civilian use was a high priority and one of the more
difficult tasks for the Kunstschutz. Their responsibilities included guarding museum
collections, marking designated cultural property and ejecting refugees, squatters or
soldiers from important buildings. Initially the Kunstschutz assigned Gennan Army units
to secure unguarded art holdings to prevent thefts from refugees during the early days of
occupation in France. 22 Later Mettemich authorized French guards to bear anns in
defense of museum collections.
One of the largest tasks faced by the Kunstschutz was controlling the billeting of
Gennan troops in the occupied territories. Lists of important homes and chateaux of
outstanding artistic or historic merit were issued to Gennan commanders along with a
proclamation stating that these buildings were a "communal ·possession of all cultured
peoples," and for that reason the advice of the Kunstschutz was to be heeded by Gennan
military personnel. 23 This demonstrates that the instructions of the Kunstschutz carried
all the way to the top of the Gennan Army and that art importance could occasionally
surpass military necessities.
The fall of France in June 1940 forced the Kunstschutz to expand their list of
duties to include opposing art theft by Nazi organizations and officials. The difficult

22
23

Ibid, 345.
Ibid, 338.
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position of Mettemich, von Tieschowitz and other Kunstschutz officers within an
oppressive Nazi-controlled state limited their actions to determined efforts at keeping
cultural property within its country of origin and stalling other German administrative
departments that tried to remove it to Germany.
These altruistic actions did not please Nazi officials, especially Hermann Goring.
Some Kunstschutz representatives determinedly stood up to Goring personally, despite
his rank as the second most powerful man in Nazi Germany after Hitler. In one incident
at the Quai d'Orsay museum in France Goring and a representative of the ERR arrived to
collect a portfolio of photographed Jewish artworks that Hitler wished to acquire. They
were met with a Kunstschutz representative who dutifully informed Goring that the
French government protested the activities of the ERR. He was silenced by Goring, but
spoke up again saying that the legal position of the art transfer was uncertain. Goring
promised that he would sort out the issue with Hitler and went about his business of
illegally acquiring artworks. 24 This example demonstrates both the inability of the
Kunstschutz to directly prevent art theft but also their persistence in defending the rights

and property of the French people.
In June 1942 Goring removed Mettemich from command of the Kunstschutz and
returned him to Germany.

Goring had deemed him "too independent minded" and

replaced him with von Tieschowitz?5 Like his predecessor, von Tieschowitz received the
support of the German Army in France and later in Italy. At one point he attempted to
move the treasures of Monte Cassino to the Vatican for safekeeping after appealing to

24

25

Ibid, 349.
Lambourne, 135.
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German Field Marshal Kesselring, commander-in-chief of Army Group C in Italy, for

$

assistance. 26 This demonstrates that the Kunstschutz made a notable effort to keep

II

artworks in their country of origin rather than shipping them to Germany.

t
j
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Von

Tieschowitz knew that he would not be able to protect all Jewish-owned art collections
from confiscation since they were private collections and not bound to their countries of
origin under ERR policies. Nonetheless, he made a "tiny mark on each piece of looted
art that passed through his hands and kept a record of where it was sent, in the hope that

one day it could be restored to its rightful owner.,,27

The Monuments Men
That day came with the arrival of Allied armies first in Italy and then in occupied
France. With them came the Monuments Men, the mostly-American equivalent of von
Tieschowitz's German organization.

The Monuments Men are famous for their

repatriation efforts of ERR looted artworks following the end of World War II, but they
engaged in very similar actions to the Kunstschutz during their involvement while the war
was still raging. Their creation story differs from the Kunstschutz in that the Monuments
Men were created out of academic petition and government intervention rather than the
strictly military involvement seen in the German Armed Forces High Command.
American academic institutions consulted with the United States federal
government about vulnerable cultural sites before Americans joined the land war in
Europe during World War II. Representatives of the Archaeological Institute of America,

Hapgood, David and David Richardson. Monte Cassino: the story ofthe most controversial battle of
World War II. Da Capo Press, 2002, 67-68.
27 Ibid, 66.

26

19

the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Fogg Museum of Fine Arts of Harvard
University and the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. met as a single group
with the U.S. State Department in the fall of 1942. A committee of the American
Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) further discussed the issue in January 1943?8
These concerned scholars approached the federal government well before American
soldiers landed in Sicily during July 1943 and Normandy during June 1944 as part of
European theatre operations.
These individuals realized that artworks and cultural heritage sites in occupied
nations were subject to damage during the inevitable invasion of Hitler's "fortress
Europe." This outreach from America's major art museums, galleries and intellectual
societies gained the attention of President Franklin Roosevelt who authorized the
cooperation of academic institutions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff - a composition of
senior Army, Navy and Army Air Corps leaders who advised federal departments on
military matters. 29 Roosevelt also authorized the creation of the Roberts Commission
(officially titled the "American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic
and Historic Monuments in War Areas") in August 1943.30 In response to Roosevelt's
authorization of the Roberts Commission, the U.S. military created its own organization
called the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Service (MFA&A).31

The famed

Monuments Men emerged from this parent organization.

Cogbill, James B. "Protection of Arts and Antiquities during Wartime: Examining the Past and Preparing
for the Future". Military Review (January-February 2008), 30.
29 Nemeth, Erik. "Conflict art: scholars develop the tactical value of cultural patrimony". Cambridge
Review ofInternational Affairs 23, No.2 (June 2010), 307.
30 Kunzelman, Charies, J. "Some Trials, Tribulations, and Successes of the Monuments, Fine Arts and
Archives Teams in the European Theatre During wwn". Military Affairs 52, No.2 (April 1988), 56.
31 Cogbill, 31.
28
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The activities of the Monuments Men were a collaborative effort of Allied nations
but a majority of their members were Americans. All together, there were approximately

185 personnel who served with the MFA&A. They included seventeen British personnel,
one Norwegian and 155 American civilians, officers and enlisted men from the Army,
Navy and Marine Corps. The number of on-duty members never exceeded thirty-five
personnel, forcing the Monuments Men to operate in small groups of two or three
members to visit each examined site or town.32 U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Theodore
DeWald, who was an ex-professor of art history at Princeton University, led the
Monuments Men. 33 Like their German counterparts, the Allies realized the importance of
enlisting academic professionals with a scholarly background in art or other cultural
property.
The Monuments Men were incorporated as a section of the Supreme Headquarters
of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) commanded by Dwight D. Eisenhower. 34
Eisenhower recognized that the advance of Allied troops would threaten shared cultural
heritage that belonged to all humanity.

He addressed soldiers advancing on Rome,

saying "Today we are fighting in a country which has contributed a great deal to our
cultural inheritance, a country rich in monuments which ...i11ustrate the growth of the
civilization which is ours.

We are bound to respect those monuments so far as war

allows.,,35 As Supreme Allied Commander, Eisenhower increased support for the
mission of the Monuments Men following the destruction of the Italian cultural site at
Monte Cassino in February 1944 and added protection of European patrimony to the list
Kunzelman, 57.
"The Venus Fixers". Time. 16 April 1945, 65.
34 Nemeth, 307.
3S Rose, C. Brian. "From the President: War and Culture", Archaeology 62, No.1 (January-February 2009).
Web. www.archive.archaeology.orgl090Iletc.lpresidentlhtml. Accessed 13 April 2013.
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of war aims.

36

The Monuments Men arrived in Europe following the 15 August 1944

Allied landings on the southern coast of France?7 They followed U.S. Army units into
liberated towns where they scoured hiding places for stolen artworks that they prepared
for future repatriation and stored them in protected locations. 38 Additionally, Monuments
Men carried lists of treasures compiled by Western art experts. If a listed building or
monument was damaged, they recorded the damage, supervised repair work and
prevented further damage to the object of cultural property.39 The Monuments Men
continued operations in Europe following the end of hostilities until the MFA&A was
dissolved in June 1946.
The Monuments Men had a similar mission as their German counterparts in the
Kunstschutz with the addition of repatriation of looted materials. Monuments Men duties

included increased awareness and native population cooperation policies like those
exhibited by the Kunstschutz, but their four main concentrations were (1) repairing
damaged monuments in Allied possession, (2) protecting monuments from damage or
misuse at the hands of Allied soldiers, (3) protecting monuments in territories occupied
by enemy forces from unnecessary damage and (4) recording theft by enemy forces and
collecting available evidence to facilitate recovery.40 They earned their name from their
primary role as protectors of statues, historic buildings and cultural landmarks. 41 This

Allen, Thomas B. "Dying for art and country". The Washington Times 29 November 2009, 3l.
Kunzelman, 57.
38 Evans, Richard J. "Art in the Time of War". The National Interest. (May-June 2011), 23.
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was a huge task encompassing 3,415 monuments listed within a 560,000 square mile area
of the European continent. 42
This large geographic challenge required cooperation from a dutifully informed
Allied chain of command. The Monuments Men increased awareness by creating several
publications to disseminate among officers and U.S. Army leadership. Monuments Men
provided Army Air Corps and infantry artillery units with lists of art treasures that must
be spared damage when possible to avoid bombing and shelling historic structures during
saturation attacks. Each entry was rated with an easily understood star system according
to age, preservation condition and reputation among the local or international community.
Three out of three stars was the highest ranking available. 43 Another method of
increasing awareness adopted by the U.S. military included a series of booklets
distributed to civil affairs officers in the European theatre.

Each issue provided

background knowledge on subjects like the geography, social hierarchy, government and
administration, religion and political history of the countries American soldiers were
entering. 44
Those booklets familiarized American Monuments Men with the cultural
environment in which they were to work and eased their entrance into building
cooperative relations with native populations. Fortunately for the Monuments Men they
were not viewed as an occupation force in the same sense as their German Kunstschutz
counterparts.

Like the Germans, the Monuments Men coordinated their efforts with

native officials to obtain information and foster good relations, particularly with museum
Kunzelman, 57.
''The Venus Fixers", 65.
44 Army Service Forces. "Civil Affairs Handbook: Atlas on Churches, Museums, Libraries and Other
Cultural Institutions in Belgium, Holland, and Denmark". Army Service Forces Manual. Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1944.
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professionals.

One notable example of cooperation is the exchanges between Rose

Vall and and U.S. Lieutenant James 1. Rorimer of the Monuments Men. Valland was a
French museum curator, art historian and member of the French resistance who spied on
the Nazi art looters of the ERR and kept track of where the artwork was sent. She
worked during the war at the Jeu de Paume, a small French museum that served as an
ERR collection point for looted art objects. 45 Lieutenant Rorimer, the Curator of
Medieval Art at the Metropolitan Museum of Art before the war, recognized the
importance and value of the information Valland could provide and met with her to
obtain details on artwork movements. 46 This cooperation with a native French citizen led
to the recovery of numerous art treasures and their repatriation to their country of origin
following the end of German occupation.
Another example of cooperation was partnering with French locals to rebuild
damaged cultural heritage sites. The Monuments Men actively organized French labor to
begin the restoration and repair of badly damaged buildings. This included protecting
them with sandbags and other methods from German bombing. 47 The partnering of
French workers and Monuments Men officers in restoration projects required significant
connections within the logistics system of the Allied militaries.

Acquiring building

materials for the necessary repairs was not an easy task. Later in the war, United States
Army commanders and members of the Allied Monuments Men complained about the
difficulties they faced during projects. Shortages of cement, lumber and readily available
labor during wartime frustrated American efforts to restore damaged buildings,
Bailey, 50.
Kunzelman, 58.
47 Hammon, Stratton. "Memoir of the Ranking Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Officer in the ETO
during World War II". Military Affairs 52, No.2 (April 1988), 66.
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particularly in Italy.48 Monuments Men were forced to improvise on various occasions.
One example is when Captain Walter 1. Farmer, an interior decorator during peacetime,
"borrowed" twenty-six tons of glass from an U.S. Anny Air Corps base for the art
collection point at Wiesbaden, Germany. The buildings there had been bombed and the
artworks within suffered from fluctuating humidity without the protection of windows.
Hundreds of structures had suffered damage following the Allied invasion of
France and required attention from the architects assigned to the Monuments Men. For
the most part, assessment and repair took precedence from 1944 to 1945 for the
Monuments Men. The museum aspect of identifying artworks for repatriation would
come to its height following the end of the war. 49 When caches of ERR looted art were
discovered the Monuments Men assigned armed guards as a means of protection from
civilians or refugees until their contents could be moved to a safer location. Occasionally
this required the removal of refugees from the area to reduce the risk of art theft. Even
the Wiesbaden art collection point required the Monuments Men to remove German
squatters living in the rubble of adjacent buildings.
Top military leaders shared the Monuments Men commitment to theft and
damage prevention.

General Eisenhower commented. on "communal possession" of

cultural property in Italy and other European nations. In a proclamation on 29 December
1943 to Allied forces he said that Italy had "contributed a great deal to our cultural
inheritance," and that their monuments "illustrate the growth of the civilization which is
ours."so The Monuments Men acted accordingly in Italy and other European nations to
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safeguard these works. One of their duties was to identify which buildings could be
occupied by military personnel and in what manner they could be used. 51 Signs were
posted in English and the local language declaring the historical significance of buildings
or monuments. The signs also declared them off limits to military personne1. 52 The
Monuments Men forced soldiers and officers found to be in violation of these
designations out of the buildings with Eisenhower's proclamation as their proof of action.
Some Monuments Men extended cultural property protection to include unorthodox
procedures. When Allied troops ignored off-limits signs for historic castles, Lieutenant
Rorimer switched to more effective white tape. This may not seem unusual to civilians,
but in military circles white tape was the standard procedure for marking areas that
contained unexploded munitions and ordnance. 53 Rorimer thus successfully provided
protection to cultural heritage sites by tricking soldiers into thinking that the sites were
hazardous.
The final responsibility of the- Monuments Men was the repatriation of looted
cultural heritage objects. Repatriation is a key component of cultural heritage protection
that maintains positive relations between the protection agency and the native population,
the countries of origin and the global community of public opinion. Looted artwork that
had been identified by Monuments Men officers was packed and shipped from the

chateaux, castle, bunker or mine it had been discovered in and arrived at centralized
collections points in Wiesbaden, Munich, Offenbach and several smaller towns in
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Gennany for cataloguing and assessment before being returned to its country of origin.
Operations at these collecting points lasted from May 1945 to 1948.
Like the Kunstschutz, the Monuments Men were dedicated to protecting cultural
property and keeping it in its country of origin whenever possible. Their dedication was
put to the test at the end of the war when a shipment of 202 of the most valuable
paintings being held at the Wiesbaden artwork collecting facility in Gennany were to be
sent to the National Gallery in Washington, D.C. for "safekeeping" and exhibition.
Removal of the artworks from Gennany would delay their repatriation and put further
distance between the works and their countries of origin.

More than twenty-five

Monuments Men officers drew up and signed the "Wiesbaden Manifesto," a document
condemning the transport and suggesting it closely resembled the same action of looting
for which Nazi war criminals were being persecuted. Despite their best efforts, the
artwork was sent to the United States and exhibited for three years before being returned
to Wiesbaden in 1949. The Wiesbaden Manifesto is believed to be the "only protest of
an official order lodged by American officers in the European theatre" during World War
II. 54

The Wiesbaden Manifesto was an act of defiance involving Monuments Men
opposing the actions of their superiors in the name of cultural patrimony and is similar to
the Kunstschutz officer who stood up to Goring and the ERR.

Here we find two

examples - one American and one Gennan - of military personnel contradicting a
hierarchal order of command that had been established in the European theatre of war.
This should not be surprising; a common feature of all battlefields is the friction between
54
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what appears to be chaos or disorder, and the deliberate planning of commanders. Not all
j

military matters proceed as planned and the evolving nature of the combat situation can

1

alter results. In this case, unfortunately, the protests of dissident groups of Monuments

I
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Men and Kunstschutz officers were not enough to affect the outcome of art transfer.
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Comparing the policies and practices of the Kunstschutz and Monuments Men

!

J!

reveals that both organizations found ways to protect cultural heritage from interference,
damage and theft even when seemingly at odds with fellow soldiers and administrative
officials. The main goals of awareness, cooperation, restoration and isolation resonated
strongly within the policies of both agencies. Yet notable differences, including the
~l

,
i

I

entity that created them and where they operated, contributed to the overall outcome of
each organization.
The Monuments Men were created through a United States federal government

!

mandate and operated as an attachment of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters of the Allied
Expeditionary Force). Their association with the command structure of SHAEF gave
them the authority needed to acquire needed materials and provide Allied military units
with new orders that would protect threatened cultural heritage sites.

The German

Kunstschutz in contrast was created by military intervention and thus received support

I

from military units, occasionally in direct opposition to the Nazi political party. Field
Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Supreme Commander of the Anned Forces in France, issued
directives providing support for Kunstschutz art protection policies that prevented art
removal and subsequent theft until a directive from Hitler on 17 September 1940
prevented him from providing direct aid through military resources. 55 As a result the
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Kunstschutz frequently found itself at odds with the Gennan Embassy in France and the

ERR, who "quite freely violated the Hague Convention to pillage art, furniture, libraries,
and musical instruments from the homes of state enemies."s6 Unlike the Monuments
Men - which experienced more cooperation and freedom within Allied annies due to
endorsement from the Roosevelt administration and from SHAEF

the government of

Nazi Gennany allowed the Kunstschutz to be bullied by opposing factions in occupied
France.
Metternich, von Tieschowitz and other officers in the Kunstschutz experienced a
situation that bordered on fenced-in containment. The motives, actions and influence of
the ERR and Hennan Goring limited the extent of cultural heritage protection that could
be achieved.

The Gennan occupation force in France created a somewhat static

environment for the Kunstschutz from 1940 to 1944 that further limited their mobility
under the watchful eye of Goring. In contrast, the consistent movement of the frontline
in Italy and France following Allied breakouts in 1943 and 1944 gave the Monuments
Men flexibility in their environment at the cost of increasing the amount of territory they
were required to survey.
The stationary nature of the Gennan occupation had one benefit for the
Kunstschutz through their cultural heritage awareness campaign. The Gennans were able

to address individual soldiers on a large scale through posters that soldiers would
encounter frequently during their stay at various locations throughout France.

The

Monuments Men, usually faced with a war of offensive movement, were forced to
address cultural protection through higher levels of command.
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The Allied decision

makers on the battlefield could then incorporate the protection policies into their tactics
and, hopefully, see a trickle-down dissipation of awareness in the units they controlled.
Comparing the Kunstschutz and Monuments Men reveals that teams of educated,
academic professionals recruited by the Germans and Allies implemented similar policies
regarding cultural heritage protection. Their unique environments and varying levels of
control created separate experiences for each organization, but they managed arguable
levels of success based on the resources they had to operate with. Some aspects of their
policies overlap when compared side-by-side.

This is a remarkable accomplishment

considering that the organizations had no contact with each other until the war was nearly
over. One of the first instances of Kunstschutz collaboration with Allied forces occurred
when American soldiers reached the Rhineland region of Germany. Mettemich met with
an officer of the Monuments Men and presented him with a list of hidden cultural
treasure locations to ensure their safety under Allied protection. 57

It can be argued that the policies of the Kunstschutz and Monuments Men, given
their simultaneous and separate development by opposing sides during wartime, were a
good fit for the specific situations presented by World War II. But what about their
application after the war was over? An analysis of the opening days of the Iraq War can
reveal if the lessons provided by World War II protection agencies had been adopted - or

couldbe adopted - in a twenty-first-century conflict.
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III. Lessons "Lost"
It is clear that historical precedents had been set by the actions of the Kunstschutz

and Monuments Men. They outlined how protection agencies should operate during
invasions and occupation periods between 1940 and 1948. The invasion of Iraq and the
incident at the Iraq Museum raise two important questions when comparing recent events
with the actions of the Kunstschutz and Monuments Men. First, how many of these past
policies transcended to the Iraq War invasion begun in 2003? Second, how many lessons
of World War II were applicable to the situation in Iraq, a location that presented
remarkable differences in war fighting, armies, cultures and technology compared to their

II

1940s predecessors?

importance of Iraq in the American academic community.

t

In late November 2002 Dr. Maxwell Anderson, president of the Association of

I
I
i
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Answers begin with pre-invasion concern for the cultural

Art Museum Directors, and Dr. Ashton Hawkins, president of the American Council for

i

Cultural Policy, published an article titled "Preserving Iraq's Past" in the Washington

I

Post. It called for the U.S. government to compile a protection plan for Iraq's religious

i

and cultural sites, stressing their global importance beyond the Middle East. 58 On 24
January 2003 Dr. McGuire Gibson of the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago
joined the efforts of Dr. Anderson and Dr. Hawkins and met with Dr. Joseph Collins, the
deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations at the Pentagon.

The

Pentagon responded to their suggestions saying that they had a plan for addressing
cultural site concerns - which included placing the Iraq Museum as "#3" on the "nostrike list" - but their estimate of the number of vulnerable sites in Iraq was much lower
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than the amount cited by the academics. 59 Drs. Gibson, Anderson and Hawkins gave a
similar briefing to receptive representatives ofthe U.S. State Department, but the Defense
Department in the Pentagon had the lead role in all invasion planning. 60 The academic
influence in military operations in Iraq did not progress beyond this point before the
invasion began two months later on 20 March 2003.
U.S. Marine Captain Matthew Bogdanos strengthened the focus of the United
States on cultural heritage protection almost accidentally in April 2003. A protection
agency did not yet exist for Iraq's cultural treasures, but a pre-existing task force was
repurposed for the needs of cultural heritage preservation and repatriation at the Iraq
Museum. This team, known as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group or JIACG, saw
service in Iraq aiding the looted Iraq Museum in Baghdad.
The beginnings of JIACG are traced to the War in Afghanistan and the
commitment of the U.S. Department of Defense to fight terrorism abroad.

A

counterterrorism unit called Task Force Bowie was formed in the wake of the 9/11
attacks.

This American unit was unique because it was the first task force with

representatives from multiple government agencies to be deployed by a combat
commander to a war zone. 61 The purpose of this joint venture was to coordinate the
efforts of federal and state law enforcement organizations and military personnel in a
single entity. Participating members were individually selected from the Federal Bureau
of Investigations (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), National Security
Agency, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of the Treasury and the New York
Ibid, 31.
Ibid, 32.
61 Bogdanos, Thieves o/Baghdad, 59.
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City Police Department.

Additionally, Task Force Bowie had ties with the British

government agencies MIS (Security Service), MI6 (Intelligence Service) and Special Air
Service {SAS).62
Task Force Bowie deployed to Afghanistan with approximately one hundred
personnel in November 2001. By September 2002 they had been re-designated as the
JIACG and were given a new mission in response to the changing needs of the
Pentagon. 63 They were deployed to Iraq following the March 2003 invasion as an
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investigative unit responsible for U.N. Security Council resolution violations and
gathering evidence of terrorist activity in Iraq.
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One of the leading officers of JIACG at this time was Captain Matthew
Bogdanos.

He dispatched a team of JIACG operatives from Basra to Baghdad to

investigate and assess the damage done to the Iraq Museum once he learned on 1S April
2003 that it had been looted. Bogdanos believed that the stolen antiquities correlated

i

I

with their mission to counter terrorist activity. One of primary objectives of the JIACG
was to control the traffic of illicit weapons.

Coincidentally, the people smuggling

weapons were often the same people smuggling antiquities. Tracking down one could
lead to the other and aided the Coalition on two fronts. 64 The team lead by Bogdanos
totaled fourteen members - nine of whom were Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) agents familiar with investigations and smuggling operations

and ten additional

security personnel who parted ways with the team once th~y reached Baghdad. 65
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Beginning with their arrival on 20 April 2003, the JIACG team searched the Iraq
Museum, conducted a forensic investigation of the ransacked museum galleries and
storage areas, conducted outreach programs in the local community to build trust,
established an amnesty system for the return of looted cultural property, developed a
network of potential informants and protected the remaining artifacts in the museum
collection. With little instruction from a higher military or federal government authority,
Bogdanos and his team operated relatively freely under their own direction. Despite their
success and praise-worthy efforts given the small size of their operation, the JIACG team
at the Iraq Museum was told by the U.S. Department of Defense to stop its investigation
on 10 September 2003.66
Bogdanos was well suited to lead the JIACG team at the Iraq Museum. He had
dabbled in Roman, Greek and Mesopotamian archaeology while studying classical
literature and philosophy as an undergraduate. 67 As a civilian district attorney, his
primary talents concerned law and criminal justice. These were indispensible during the
investigation of the missing Iraq Museum antiquities, but his basic knowledge of
Mesopotamian cultural objects greatly aided the tasks faced by his team and made him a
qualified leader for the operation. The members of JIACG had not been trained in
methods of cultural heritage preservation, restoration or repatriation and thus did not have
a rubric to follow during their operations. They created their own policies "on the go"
that resemble the duties fulfilled by the· Kunstschutz and Monuments Men sixty years
earlier.

These duties included (1) raising awareness, (2) cooperation with local

populations, (3) isolating protected sites and (4) repatriation. The JIACG adhered to
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these duties to the best of their abilities given their available resources and the situation
they faced in war-tom Baghdad.
Bogdanos increased awareness for the plight of the Iraq Museum by submitting
reports to his superiors in the U.S. Department of Defense and by seeking the assistance
of academic and international parties outside Iraq. Bogdanos shared his findings and Iraq
Museum experience with archaeologists and other academics in the hopes of building
relationships and increasing awareness. Bogdanos addressed three hundred attendees of
the 49th Reconstre Assyriologique Internatlonale, a meeting of learned individuals
gathered to discuss Mesopotamian archaeology, which was hosted by the British Museum
on 11 July 2003. Bogdanos understood the importance of bringing law enforcement, art
and archaeological communities together and that their cooperation would increase the
success of his ongoing investigation in Baghdad. Bogdanos sought their support for the
investigation and was not disappointed. He "learned much about art smuggling" as a
result of his attendance "and walked away with a list of experts who volunteered to be
'on call' whenever law enforcement authorities needed to verify the origin of a seizure or
recovery.,,68 Bogdanos expanded his outreach to include other interested institutions and
organizations, including the Archaeological Institute of America, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, University of Cambridge
and McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research at Cambridge. He "began to build
up a cadre of confidential informants (smugglers, curators, archaeologists and dealers) for
the future" needs of JIACG operations in lraq.69
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The JIACG developed international relations to supplement their academic
contacts. With the assistance of the Iraq Museum staff Bogdanos and his team were able
to distribute photographs of missing antiquities to customs officials and border officials
in the neighboring countries of Iraq. Photographs were shared with the International
Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) who then distributed them to the 182 member
countries of that organization. Legal professionals and police departments in major cities
like New York and London also received photograph collections. 7o Missing antiquities
were likely to tum up at these destinations. Promoting threatened and missing antiquities
through documentation and photographs reduced the risk that they would cross the Iraq
border, unchecked, into foreign countries, thus keeping them within their country of
origin until they could be recovered.
Cooperation with organizations outside military operations in Iraq was certainly
beneficial to the efforts of JIACG when they began repatriating artifacts from the Iraq
Museum collection, but they also worked continuously to foster relations with the native
Iraqi population around them. Bogdanos made it clear from his first meeting with Iraq
Museum staff that any efforts to restore the museum must be a joint effort between his
team and their personnel. He assured them that "together we can fix this" and "get back
the property of the Iraqi people.'.71 JIACG agents spent each morning consulting with
museum director Dr. Nawala al-Mutwali and research director Dr. Donny George
Youkhanna, as well as State Board of Antiquities and Heritage chairman Dr. Jaber
Khaleel Ibrahim. They supplemented the collections knowledge of these individuals with
tips from the streets ofBaghdad.
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An "information operation campaign" involved Bogdanos and JIACG members
performing daily afternoon excursions into the surrounding community to promote the
return of looted antiquities to the Iraq Museum. The JIACG fostered relations with Iraqi
citizens by sharing cups of tea and chatting over games of backgammon. 72 As the trust of
local Iraqis grew, the number of informants and recovered artifacts increased. Bogdanos
had established from the beginning of JIACG operations with the Iraq Museum that their
participation was a recovery effort, not a prosecution. Iraqis who had stolen artifacts
from the museum for so-called "safekeeping" experienced a change of heart once they
realized they were stealing from their own cultural heritage rather than from the Saddam
Hussein regime that had mistreated their friends, family and nation. 73
Unfortunately, the JIACG could not protect the Iraq Museum during the Hussein
regime collapse and were not aware its collections were threatened until it was too late.
Bogdanos first heard news reports about the looting on 15 April, three days after the
looting period ceased. 74 Given the circumstances of the Iraq invasion, the JIACG
situation involved mitigating and reversing the damage to the Iraq Museum collection
rather than taking precautions to avoid damage in the first place. This was due to the lack
of manpower available for securing the Iraq Museum and other cultural heritage sites.
The speed with which Coalition forces achieved victory over the Iraqi military
contributed to a swift collapse of the security system that had previously existed in Iraq to
curb looting. There were not enough Coalition troops in Baghdad to deal with remaining
pockets of resistance and simultaneously control the looting. As a result, the "U.S. Army
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initially allowed the looting to continue unchecked.,,75

Looting extended beyond

Baghdad to hundreds of archaeological sites throughout the whole of Iraq. The United
States and Coalition forces simply did not have enough personnel to adequately protect
all of them. Bogdanos remarked that they did not even have enough people to conduct
the investigation of the Iraq Museum, let alone recover the museum collection and protect
the archaeological sites. 76
The JIACG team was not large enough to care for all of the cultural property of
Iraq, but they did strive to protect the remaining collections of the Iraq Museum as soon
as they heard of the looting. Once the team arrived at the Iraq Museum they immediately
set up camp within the museum compound. 77 Their residence in the museum library
ensured that they could have quick access throughout the compound in the event of a
threat. Their position enabled them to monitor access to other museum buildings while
being physically removed from the museum collections. Their continued presence during
their six-month investigation and repatriation efforts was a security measure and deterrent
to subsequent thefts.
The JIACG efforts of repatriation acted on a much smaller scale than their World
War II predecessors and were limited by their manpower. The JIACG team operated in
close proximity to the Iraq Museum in order to continue their investigation while
pursuing looted museum artifacts. An amnesty program was established that would not
persecute Iraqi citizens for returning stolen museum property. Object recovery began
four days after the JIACG team arrived at the museum with their first return occurring on
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24 April 2003. Recovered objects continued to be a daily success as Bogdanos and
JIACG members made their trips into the surrounding Iraqi community.

Here they

promoted the amnesty program and ensured those in possession of looted objects that
they could safely return them to the JIACG. 78 Many Iraqis complied with the gentle
pressure of JIACG agents once they realized that they were benefiting their own cultural
heritage and would not be viewed as criminals. As of September 2010, repatriation
operations begun by the JIACG have recovered "roughly half' of fifteen thousand
artifacts that had been looted from the Iraq Museum collection. 79
The recovery of thousands of missing objects from the Iraq Museum is an
ongoing process, just like the repatriation efforts begun by the Monuments Men sixty
years ago. It is estimated that one hundred thousand objects looted during World War II
by the Nazi regime have yet to be returned to their rightful owners. 80 Neither war
appears to have produced an ideal cultural heritage protection policy given the massive
quantities of looted material that remains to be recovered. The policies practiced were
developed in mutually exclusive conditions and styles of warfare that explain the
differences between the Kunstschutz, Monuments Men and JIACG experiences.
Unlike the Monuments Men or their Kunstschutz contemporaries of World War II,
the invasion of Iraq did not begin with a specific organization purposely designed to
protect cultural heritage and staffed by academic that followed soldiers into battle. The
Kunstschutz and Monuments Men arrived in the European theatre after their respective

nations had begun their military operations, but an equivalent organization did not
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materialize during the initial phases of the Iraq War. The JIACG were involved with
counterterrorism operations elsewhere in Iraq when they heard of the Iraq Museum
looting and decided to relocate to Baghdad as quickly as possible.
The JIACG were a smaller unit than either the Kunstschutz or Monuments Men
and thus had fewer capabilities. Unlike their World War II predecessors, Bogdanos and
his team of JIACG agents were not equipped to repair damage of any kind that had been
inflicted on the Iraq Museum. The personnel under his command had specializations in
law enforcement and forensic investigations rather than construction or architecture like
members of the Monuments Men. Bogdanos worked with limited resources and he did
not possess the command authority to divert construction materials or labor from
Coalition armies to assist the Iraq Museum. In comparison, the Kunstschutz received
priority status due to their favor with German Army commanders, notably Field Marshal
Keitel in France and Field Marshal Kesselring in Italy.81

It should be noted that German

military forces were much larger in World War II than the invasion force that entered
Iraq in 2003. Coalition forces numbered approximately 300,000 during the invasion.
The German occupation force of France matched that number but was not occupied with
active combat like the Coalition forces in Iraq. The Germans also had access to the
resources of a total war economy that supplied millions of soldiers.

The German

occupation forces were able to mobilize additional resources and labor from the French
population, something that was not immediately available to Bogdanos and the JIACG
during the disorganization that followed the defeat of Iraq military forces.
World War II was a massive conflict when measured by men and materiel, but the
geographic scale of the fighting placed soldiers at considerable distances from home.
81
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The war was quite literally an ocean away and limited American academic involvement
on the frontline to the specialists selected for the Monuments Men. Today, modem
conflicts seem closer to home because of the increased travel and communication
capabilities of a globalized society.

Academic organizations took advantage of this

during the Iraq War and became directly involved by aiding Captain Bogdanos and
~
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Ii

promoting awareness among troops in Iraq.
Academics who promoted the threatened state of Iraqi cultural heritage did not

I

I•
I

stop once the JIACG halted their operations with the Iraq Museum.

I

institutions continued efforts of increasing military awareness by extending their target

I

audience beyond the Defense Department to individual soldiers overseas.

l

1
~

j

Academic

The

Archaeological Institute of America (AIA) has been guest lecturing on military bases in
the United States, Iraq and Afghanistan for the last seven years. These lessons provide

~

i

soldiers with background knowledge of cultural property they may encounter during their

I

deployment to Iraq, Afghanistan or other locations in Central Asia. An emphasis on art

i

I

basics, archaeology and historic preservation give these soldiers an advantage that can aid

i

recovery and repatriation efforts. 82

Recently a four-day training conference was

conducted from 17 to 20 December 2012 by American experts in law enforcement and
cultural heritage protection from the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) department
of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the same organization that
provided agents to Bogdanos' JIACG team prior to the Iraq invasion. The conference
discussed methods of identifying cultural heritage sites, preventing looting and
investigating looting and illegal trafficking with police investigators from the Iraqi
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Ministry of Interior. Representatives from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Justice, U.S. National Park Service and Interpol were also present. S3
These are steps in the right direction for the future of recovery and repatriation
operations in Iraq, but the thousands of unaccounted artifacts may continue to sway
public opinion. Did the U.S. military learn any lessons from their predecessors in the
Monuments Men? The JIACO developed policies of awareness, cooperation, repatriation
and protection that had an equivalent in Monuments Men policies. They lacked the
capability to repair structures and could not match the commitment level of the
Monuments Men in all policies. The changes between the wartime environments of the
1940s and 2000s can rationalize why the practices of World War II did not appear to have
a larger influence on military actions of the Iraq War. The contrast between the wartime
experiences of the Kunstschutz, Monuments Men and JIACO and their resulting policies
to the conditions of those experiences can be better understood using the evolution of war
as a guide.

Viewing the differences of their protection efforts through the lens of

evolving warfare emphasizes the need for fluidity in protection planning for any future
military confrontation.

83 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. "HSI conducts training conference on countering
antiquities trafficking in Iraq". U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 20 Dec 2012. Web.
http://www.ice.gov/news/releaseslI212/121220baghdad.htm. Accessed 26 April 2013.
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IV. Analyzing Policy Planning Through the Lens of Warfare
It is very easy to view the looting of the Iraq Museum in April of 2003 with pangs

of anguish and a concern for what went wrong. Many people asked "How could theft of
this scale happen," considering the capabilities of the United States military as the
premier force of organized soldiers in the world. The United States is a global leader in
defense spending, technological application and military networked communications.
The Pentagon in Washington, D.C. studies numerous scenarios concerning aspects of the
battle space and how U.S. forces will respond to threats.

How then, with all the

technological and strategic benefits of twenty-first-century modem warfare, could the
United States military manage to let a destructive blow to global cultural heritage occur at
the Iraq Museum?
The simplest answer to this question has two parts: (l) the battlefield is dominated
by chaos and complexity and (2) the U.S. military had adopted a decentralized network of
units. Warfare is chaotic in nature and quite unpredictable by the best strategists and
tacticians. Any premeditated strategies for invading Iraq had to be constantly updated
with new information and modified by U.S. commanders. Countless instances occurring
simultaneously across the battle space create "noise" that obstructs awareness and slows
military action. A top-down military command structure cannot easily respond to all
these instances for fear of sensory information overload. That is why the U.S. military
adopted a model of non-linear networking during the invasion of Baghdad.

The

command structure was dispersed horizontally among decentralized units that were
responsible for their own objectives and fulfilling an overall mission. One of these units

I

t

lI
l

made its own decision when confronted with fighting in and around the Iraq Museum.

I

I

f
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A common conception that military forces are well-oiled machines held together
by strict adherence to order could cause one to question the extent of unpredictability in
warfare.

Historian John Keegan explains that the fundamental purpose of military

training is "to reduce the conduct of war to a set of rules and a system of procedures 
and therefore to make orderly and rational what is essentially chaotic and instinctive. ,,84
The battlefield is a jarring combination of numerous events and possible outcomes mixed
with confusion and speculation. The role of the military is to assess the situation and
attempt to impose order over chaos through regimentation, which is a stark contrast to the
unruly nature of battle. Surely a modernized and well-trained force is prepared to meet
the challenges that come their way?
Not entirely true, according to General Helmut von Moltke, the famed nineteenthcentury Prussian strategist. "The commander is compelled during the whole campaign to
reach decisions on the basis of situations than cannot be predicted." 85

Military

commanders need to recognize and adapt to challenges created by battlefield chaos rather
than attempt to banish it through training or other preparations.

Even a command

structure prepared to process battlefield intelligence as fast as it is available and alter
orders almost immediately is not guaranteed success. The U.S. military cannot move and
act with the precision and quick thinking of a single entity. Nineteenth-century military
strategist Carl von Clausewitz argued that the "military machine" must be reduced to
basic individuals, each with its own level of friction on the battlefield. Friction is thus
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introduced everywhere at once rather than in concentrated locations, contributing to
numerous incidents that are "impossible to calculate" or prepare for in advance.

86

During the Cold War a new conceptual framework took hold of U.S. defense
thinking in an attempt to reduce unpredictability. The advent of the computer and its
incorporation into the military as a data processor and numbers cruncher during World
War II led commanders to believe that the uncertainty and unpredictability that defined
chaos on the battlefield could be overcome through information technology.87 Chaos was
seen as an information deficiency rather than an inescapable element of warfare. Massive
amounts of data were collected and processed in an attempt to reach battlefield clarity
and subordinate the theatre of war. The new term "command and control" described the
belief that commanders could issue orders, receive new information through feedback of
their technology system and adjust subsequent orders accordingly.88
This "cybernetic model" was adopted during the Vietnam War and endorsed by
General William Westmoreland, leader of United States forces during the conflict. It
influenced his vision for the near future of combat. In 1969 he predicted that within ten
years the United States could experience an automated battlefield that thrived on
information and consisted of "computer assisted intelligence evaluation," automated fire
control and "24-hour real or near-real time surveillance of all types."S9 Unfortunately,
this technologically adept war fighting style was not to be as the debacle of Vietnam

86 Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984,67.
87 Bousquet, Antoine. The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields ofModernity.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2009,124.
88 Ibid, 129.
89 Bousquet, Antoine. "Chaoplexic warfare or the future of military organization". International Affairs 84,
No.5 (2008), 923.
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shook the scientific fundamentals that backed the cybernetic model of war. Confidence
in statistical data returning from the front that indicated success on paper caused
commanders to continue feeding the numbers back into the system and exacerbated the
real problem. The cybernetic model masked the reality that the United States was losing
the war to a less advanced, less trained and more poorly equipped Third World guerilla
force.
"Defeat in Vietnam exposed the shortcomings of cybernetic warfare and revealed
the inherent limitations of its attempt to make war into an entirely controllable and
predictable activity.,,9o Vietnam was a rude awakening that caused a shift from the
cybernetic model to what international relations expert Antoine Bousquet refers to as
"chaoplexity," a term combining the chaos and complexity of the modem battlefield.
This model retains the technology dependence of the cybernetic model but discards the
top-down "command and control" structure for a non-linear network. Computer scientist
Christopher Langton supports this method saying "since it's effectively impossible to
cover every conceivable situation, top-down systems are forever running into
combinations of events they donlt know how to handle.,,91 In contrast, "decentralized
systems of quasi-autonomous units can operate more effectively and with a greater
degree of adaptability on the basis of the local calculations of the networked agents
constituting them.,,92 This is a solution to the "noise" or "friction" defined by von
Clausewitz that permeates the theatre of war. Noise obstructs decision-making and slows
down the military machine. Figuring out how to work within the chaos and noise - rather
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than control or predict it - can be achieved, in theory, by decentralized units fighting
within a non-linear network.
The United States forces deployed to Baghdad in April 2003 were decentralized
in their organizational nature. Units were connected in a horizontal network of highspeed data links and possessed tactical decision making capabilities traditionally
associated with the hierarchical command structure of past wars.93 A rapid collapse of
Iraqi forces in Baghdad was necessary to prevent the battle for the city from turning into
a drawn-out siege. "Self-synchronized" units that could move independently and quickly
seize objectives negated the need for a top-down chain of command that risked creating a
bottleneck of orders and thus bog down American forces in the mire of urban warfare.
Armored and high-mobility mechanized infantry units utilizing this tactic successfully
completed "thunder runs" through the heart of the city that contributed to the
disorganization and fall of Iraqi resistance in Baghdad. 94
The expedient fall of Baghdad was a signal to Coalition commanders that the
network-centric style of warfare adopted by the U.S. military had achieved victory. Yet
the looting of the Iraq Museum still resonates as a defeat. It should be noted, however,
that the decentralized, non-linear network approach may have saved the Iraq Museum
from complete destruction. On 9 April 2003 a tank company from Task Force 1-64,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eric Schwartz, approached the museum compound
with a general objective to hold the nearby crossroads. Once there, they began to draw
heavy fire from Iraqi Republican Guard forces, some of which had taken up residence in
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the compound. The next day LTC Schwartz decided to pull his forces back rather than
risk damaging the museum by engaging the Iraqi troops, which turned out to be a
"tactically wrong but culturally brilliant decision.,,95
No commander told LTC Schwartz "You need to take the museum compound and
hold it." He viewed the Iraqi resistance at the compound, assessed the situation and made
a tactical decision to pull his forces back. Logic dictates that this was the right thing to
do. If Task Force 1-64 and the heavy weaponry of their Abrams tanks had engaged the
Republican Guard units, which had fortified themselves in the museum compound, there
would have been nothing left of the museum or its collection of Mesopotamian artifacts.
Millennia of cultural heritage would have been destroyed and lost to the world.
Discussions by retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski. and technology specialist John
Garstka at the U.S. Naval Institute confirm the decision-making power of Schwartz.
Cebrowski and Garstka maintain that the enormous complexity of military operations
dictate a bottom-up approach during the chaos of battle.96
If Task Force 1-64 made the culturally right choice by not attacking the Iraq
Museum compound, who was directly responsible for the protection of its cultural
property? It was not intended to be the U.S. military. The quick defeat of Iraqi armed
forces led to rapid destabilization in Baghdad.

Fifty thousand street criminals were

released during the invasion by the Saddam Hussein regime before its collapse. 97 This
led to the disintegration of the Iraqi police force and the chief element of order that
should have been available to curb looting and protect the Iraq Museum. The stability of
Ibid, 204-206.
Cebrowski, Arthur K. and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future",
Proceedings ofthe U.S. Naval Institute 24, No.1 (January 1998): 28-35.
97 Bogdanos, Thieves ofBaghdad, 14.
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the city spiraled into the ground without a police force or justice department and set the
stage for widespread theft of private property and the museum collection. Remember that
unpredictable chaos is an inescapable element of war.
Traditionally, victory over a military opponent is followed by a "transition or
handoff of responsibility from military to civilian agencies." But the "endemic post
conflict violence" and disorganization that prevailed in Iraq ensured that "the burden for
providing stability was left to the agency with numbers on the ground: the [U.S.
Army].,,98 The void created by the non-existent Iraqi justice department left U.S. forces
the responsibility of providing stability in Iraq, a task that it was unprepared for.
Long-term decisions made by American policymakers and army leaders prior to
the Iraq War had transformed the U.S. military into a "narrowly but fully capable,
combat-centric force" which limited their ability for "organizational adaptation.,,99 The
U.S. military is a combat force for a combat situation. It was trained, equipped and
prepared for fighting a similar enemy force in Iraq. This did not include policing theft by
unarmed looters in a foreign population.
It was a difficult situation, but U.S. forces did adapt to the circumstances in Iraq.

The JIACG team of Captain Bogdanos is primarily responsible for launching an
investigation of the Iraq Museum and creating a repatriation system for looted artifacts
that is still in use by the museum. Their organized response within days of the looting
justifies the decentralized non-linear model and that smaller units "tend to be readily

Serena, Chad C. A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War. Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2011,167.
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capable of making quick adjustments to their immediate organizational inputs and
outputs."100
The U.S. military response to museum protection must be as flexible as its troops
were required to be in Iraq. It is not easy, however, to draw from the lessons of previous
conflicts.

Even von Clausewitz noted that every war is unique in that it follows a

singular path that cannot be entirely predicted. lol This is embodied in current United
States understanding of war as shown in a U.S. Marine Corps doctrine publication,
stating, "it is unreasonable to expect command and control to provide precise, predictable
and mechanistic order to a complex undertaking like war.,,102
Bousquet argues that "a scientific way ofwarfare, understood as the application of
the methodological and theoretical frameworks of science to the exercise of military
force, established itself at the beginning of the modem era and has since grown in
influence to become one of the dominant lenses through which armed conflict is
contemplated.,,103 Military minds from Frederick the Great in the eighteenth~century to
Westmoreland in the twentieth and General Tommy Franks in the

twenty~first

have

sought to apply technologic theory to their battle plans in order to achieve a successful
outcome. The Vietnam War proved that advanced technological capability does not
dictate success on the battlefield. It is a tool, but not a

cure~all

for any problem. The

inescapable chaos of the battlefield will cloud judgment and slow reaction time, leaving
armed conflict no less predictable than what von Clausewitz observed when he first wrote
about the "fog of war."
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V. The Known and the Unknown
Chaos and unpredictability are unavoidable hurdles of the battlefield but it is
possible to navigate around them. Chaos exists within the structures of order and the
presence of one defines the other. Order can be achieved by establishing guidelines
based on common aspects of World War II and Iraq War cultural heritage protection
policies.

The availability of these guidelines among military circles and other

organizations involved with war planning or training soldiers could help prevent the next
cultural heritage emergency from happening.
The requirements for protecting museums, art galleries and cultural sites must be
readily understood by all military powers before they become involved in a conflict.
Warfare is unpredictable and any plan is subject to change. It is therefore best to have
guidelines prepared before the fighting starts rather than during or after the conflict is
over. That way military decision-makers can concentrate on how to alter the guidelines
to the current battle situation rather than begin from scratch. American academics that
convened in 1943 to address the war effort made their assessments eight months before
the Allied invasion of Italy and eighteen months before the invasion of France. In
comparison, academic meetings with the Pentagon occurred less than three months prior
to the Iraq War. A wider window of time is needed to prepare guidelines that consider

II

environmental and cultural conditions soldiers are expected to encounter in a specified
theatre of war.
The Kunstschutz, Monuments Men and JIACG each developed their own policies
concerning awareness, cooperation, isolation and repatriation. These four experiences

f

identify the main requirements needed in the next generation of protection policies and
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they must be reestablished for progress to be made. Increasing awareness about the
threat to cultural heritage treasures is an effective way to promote heritage protection
among military forces, local inhabitants, academic organizations and government
institutions.

Implementation of an awareness policy can take the form of written

documents, lectures, commutative seminars or conferences and should focus on
identification, handling and basic care for threatened cultural materials.

The target

audience should be soldiers, commanders, civilian museum professionals and culture
groups that will be directly involved in the theatre of war as well as any organization or
institution that may have an interest or specialization in the cultural artifacts located
there. These include international bodies such as the International Council of Museums
(ICOM), Interpol and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). The demands of non-linear warfare stress the importance of the
smallest military units operating independently and render trickle-down methods of
information interpretation unreliable. For this reason information must be packaged in a
way that appeals to individual soldiers and can be understood by people of diverse
backgrounds. This delivery method is preferable over targeting commanders and relying
on subsequent circulation through their own communication channels.
Any information that is distributed must be shared across the board through local,
"in-house" and international cooperation. "Local" may include the native inhabitants of a
theatre of war and the soldiers and military personnel deployed there.

Interrelated

organizations or departments of the same government should form an "in-house" bond
such as the American representatives from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and U.S. Department of Justice who participated in coordinated efforts of Task
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Force Bowie in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Sharing information with like-minded

organizations from other nations - for example the FBI and CIA members of Task Force
Bowie and their ties to British MIS and MI6 agencies - creates a valuable network that
can address protection policies from multiple angles. Incorporation of these three types
of cooperation creates an all-inclusive horizontal structure of communication. Non-linear
warfare favors this pattern and it eliminates information sharing problems associated with
top-down hierarchies.
Developing a network for communications can be applied to the isolation and
repatriation policies of invasion and occupation military forces.

Once a list of

endangered buildings, monuments or objects has been created it can be disseminated
along these channels to alert soldiers and commanders which structures require their
attention.

Subsequent action includes sheltering them from damage when possible,

marking them as protected sites and preventing their use by soldiers, civilians and
refugees. Lists of endangered or missing cultural heritage objects can be distributed
locally in the theatre of war and internationally - particularly with border countries and
cities with a concentrated market for cultural treasures - using the horizontal
communication network to prevent them from leaving the theatre of war or to expedite
their repatriation.
The core lessons garnered from the experiences of the Kunstschutz, Monuments
Men and JIACG on awareness, cooperation, isolation and repatriation during wartime are
applicable to any future conflict, yet they serve only as guidelines. A successful cultural
heritage protection policy will use knowledge provided by the guidelines to quickly adapt
the policy-in-practice to the situation at hand. The result is a fluid policy that is not
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bound by definitive properties that may be hampered by the unpredictability of the
battlefield. This concept of a written yet unwritten policy may be perplexing, especially
to members of the museum field.
Museum professionals,

especially registrars

who deal with collections

management, appeal to established rules and regulations when confronted with a
problem. Existing knowledge on legal issues, appropriate humidity, temperature and
light levels are based on past experience and not prone to change. It is easy to see how
the apparent orderly nature of collections management and the protection of cultural
property afforded by a stable museum policy are not applicable when the unpredictability
of warfare is considered. The case of the Iraq Museum is an unfortunate instance in
which the chaos of warfare dismantled any hopes of saving the collection through pre
meditated action. No one predicted the scale of looting by the Iraqi people, not even the
museum staff, and little was done to prevent theft or break-ins.

Preparations for

protecting the museum collection had been concerned with buffering sensitive artifacts
from the vibrations of aerial bombardment. Director of research Dr. Donny George said
the museum staff never thought the museum could be 100ted. 104
The looting of the Iraq Museum is a prime example of the contradictory
relationship between planning and chaos in warfare. It is impossible to calculate and
prepare for all conceivable events that could occur at a museum. Even if an outcome is
known, the most carefully constructed strategies - created by military commanders and
museum staff alike - are not guaranteed to remain intact once the bullets start flying. The
key to success in cultural heritage protection during wartime lies in being able to adapt
104
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quickly to whatever fate may throw your way and to rely less on a regimented action
plan. To summarize the words of General Helmut von Moltke appearing at the beginning
of this paper, "no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy."
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